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This paper explores the relationships that China maintains with states in and around the Horn of 
Africa region. In these relationships, China’s new global project, the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), is used to understand the social, political, and economic outcome of countries that opt to 
partner with the Asian power. Using Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda as separate case studies, 
the positives and negatives of cooperation become easier understand. The results vary, as the 
political and economic stability varies in each country, as does cooperation with China predates 
the BRI’s 2013 start date. The results present that of the possible benefits as China offers a 
reasonable and attractive alternative to the aid and agreements posited by liberal democracies. Yet, 
while China offers economic growth and limited security, it finds difficulty in appealing to the 
locals and workers. Hence, this paper shows that China’s overall approach is self-centered and 
economic driven, which opposes the priorities that the European Union has been attempting 
establish with its southern neighbors. However, while the Chinese do not export authoritarian 
practices or self-interest in its partners, it does little to reinforce the democratic institutions in 
Africa. Instead the BRI seems like a political tool in proving that economic development and 
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Belt and Road Initiative 
Background 
 Within the last two decades, the meteoric rise of China’s economy and global prominence 
has led western powers to consider potential new threats from the authoritarian regime. The 
United States and some transatlantic allies, such as France and the United Kingdom (UK), have 
far greater stakes in the region due to their historical ties to South East Asia and specific 
economic interests which come (Lind 2019). For other European countries, especially those 
within the European Union, the stakes of allowing for a domineering China in the Pacific do not 
seem to outweigh the benefits of abstaining from such concerns. In fact, member states that have 
more to gain from the economic prosperity of China, are more likely to get in the way of 
condemnations and plans to undo the East Asian country’s actions. The actions in question 
include aggressive protectionist policies and frequent theft in intellectual properties from western 
patents (Lind 2019). Transatlantic leaders consider these to be just as big of a concern for 
security in the west, just as much as any real potential military threat that China poses. In 
Europe, China persists to be a wedge between member states in the discussion on China, with 
partners of the Asian powerhouse citing lucrative investments and mutual trade benefits. The 
issue is greater than the fear of any economic insecurity or uncertainty that comes with an 
unchecked, rising China, or its rapidly modernizing military.  
 What has become more apparent is that China’s soft power, or that its brand is becoming 
far too influential, or perhaps outpacing any visible transition towards more democratic practices. 
Concerns that China becoming involved in global development is certainly a matter of discussion 
in Europe, as the former becomes more invested in economic regions that are shared by the 
latter. The regions, in this case, Include Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and even Eastern 
European countries. Chinese Investment comes in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), which is intended to be an infrastructure and economic development program in 
partnering countries to make trade areas more accessible to China. This initiative is heavy-
handed in construction-based development, and opening transportation gateways on both land 
and sea. In contrast, the European Union’s presence in neighborhood countries and other third 
countries is considerably more robust, with mission goals that coincide with the organization's 
own tenets and values. One should note that the EU offers economic aid and cooperation to third 
countries with the intent to promote the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, and in some 
cases, even has security personnel operating on location to maintain peace in high-risk areas. The 
EU further sets itself apart from China by becoming more involved with policy implementation 
in partner countries. Despite this, the way China has chosen to become involved with its global 
partners does not discount the mutually beneficial outcomes that the BRI will have for both 
parties.  
 Of course, this paper is not about comparing the attractiveness or effectiveness of the 
EU’s foreign development programs and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Instead, I question if 
Europe should be concerned with an encroaching China in various partnering regions. As 
mentioned previously, there are already signs that the discussion on responding to Chinese 




11 countries being a part of China’s recent “17+1” initiative (formerly 16+1), an effort to 
promote business and economic investment between China and Central and Eastern Europe 
(Lind 2019). Other member states countries have also fallen under the fold of Chinese 
partnership in the form of the RBI, such as Italy, Poland, and even Germany. Let it be clear, 
however, that any concerns over these partnerships are not held out of opposition to a non-
western country becoming a potential superpower, or because of a competitive economic threat 
that China holds over many western markets. Instead, much of the charging equates to two fears, 
the first being that what China values and deems as acceptable in terms of social policy and 
economic competition will spread to other countries developing countries with weaker 
democratic institutions. The other is that those who find themselves more aligned with China 
will find it difficult to condemn or sanction them. The latter of these two instances, however, is 
not driving force behind this study. 
 A well-written report could be made about the potential consequences of the Belt and 
Road Initiatives in affecting the European Union’s global development plans. The results have 
already been discussed by numerous scholars, citing Chinese military positioning in Africa and 
the Middle East, and deteriorating European cohesion has serious implications (Kilman and 
Grace 2018, 9-10). Kilman and Grace consider these consequences immediate dangers and are 
essentially “tell-tale” of what has already occurred and is much easier to grasp for western 
leaders and policymakers. Both scholars also note the BRI’s worrisome interference in 
development and governance within partnering countries. They believe that China’s own 
authoritarian behavior and general relaxation towards corruption outside its own control could 
reflect or perhaps rub off on its individual partners. Consider that even in choosing potential 
partners, China does not have reservations against working with obstinate undemocratic 
countries like the EU does;  “many of the countries involved in the Belt and Road feature high 
levels of corruption and low levels of democracy” (Kilman and Grace, 12). And unlike the 
European Union, China does not try to offset social and political policies within the partner 
countries to retain the attractiveness of their deals. Despite this, Beijing is still willing to 
reinforce its support for authoritarian regimes that are affiliated BRI; a case made evident in the 
Maldives when they “…supported President Abdulla Yameen after his declaration of a state of 
emergency and jailing of judges and opposition politicians”(Kilman and Grace, 12).  This effect 
brings about what other scholars refer to as the “illiberal regional security order,” where 
democracy and individual freedoms are ignored in favor of ”…social and economic stability” 
(Ratner and Greenberg, 3).  Even then, deviation towards illiberalism is not the sole problem that 
the EU is concerned with as the attractiveness of low cost of social/political for economic 
development could undermine Europe’s own development programs. 
Introduction 
 In acknowledging that there is a distinct problem in the form of encroaching illiberalism 
in states outside of the EU, this paper will focus on not just the issue of individual rights, but also 
the BRI’s effect of causing regression in other goals set by the European Union for its global 
efforts. For example, one should ask: how does China’s method of international development 




country? We ask these questions to assist in determining if there is an observable cost or a 
negative to the seemingly immediate benefits of BRI. We consider these questions with a lack of 
congruency between them, as not all are necessarily applicable to each case. In recognizing what 
could potentially be affected by the program, it is necessary to attempt to measure and quantify 
the changes in non-member states that are both China and the EU have a mutual interest in 
developing. Both parties have extensive influence and operations across the world, and as 
already mentioned above, China has partnerships with many European member states. While this 
is an issue apparent to political cohesion within the EU, the main concern should be oriented at 
countries that are more susceptible to regression in democratic practices, like poorer African 
countries, or historically authoritarian Middle Eastern Countries. 
Methods  
For this problem question, a small set of case studies were observed and measured in 
several easily accessible indexes to conduct a cross-case study analysis. The topic question 
should be relegated to one region, or at least on one continent; in this case, the study was 
conducted in four different countries in Africa. The area in specific should be within the Horn of 
Africa, which includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. These are all countries that enjoy 
both aid from the European Union and have either transportation or energy development projects 
with China. These countries are considered a part of China’s “Road” portion of the initiative, due 
to the lack of a suitable mainland route. Road instead refers to the development of new sea routes 
from China to the west, and as of now, they consider all of Africa or anything that is not Europe 
or Asia to be a part of this expanse. Europe’s development policies will not be reviewed, or at 
least this study will not go into detail on European involvement. Acknowledgment that there is a 
mutual connection between European and Chinese participation is sufficient for the case study. 
 The variables for each case study are constant; however, the extent to which information 
is provided for each country is limited. The variables in question are also diversified but were 
considered as questions, as they were presented in the introduction of this paper. The questions 
were posed to be separate, but are intended to reflect a joint assessment of potential 
consequences for partnership with China. With these variables, there is a potential for results that 
reflect the positive outcomes of the projects. The results will be considered positive if there is no 
substantial change in towards negative consequences, or if the data leans towards more positive-
leaning outcomes. In any of those two cases, the hypothesis that BRI has negative social and 
political implications should thus be rejected for that country or case study. Given that each 
country has different levels of funding and bilateral agreements between themselves and China, 
the outcome of data will not be congruent with one another. Additionally, histories and 
backgrounds of each case study will be undeniably different, with some having already had 
weakening or strengthening environmental and democratic institutions. In-depth comparisons 
between different countries would be unnecessary and, instead, simply show the extent of the 
program in all states.  
How the data is gathered had specific stipulations that may be unique to each case study, 
as some countries had signed up for the BRI at different periods in time starting 2013. Two sets 




before a case studies agreement to join the BRI, and the other being the most recent available 
data. In addition, some assessments of the variables such as the environment or workers' safety, 
may not be quantifiable, but instead are recorded as qualitative information on notable changes, 
or report.  
Ethiopia 
 Ethiopia was one of the first countries in Northern Africa to sign on and partner with 
Beijing to deepen an economy between the two. Since 2012, China has been instrumental in 
building up the transportation infrastructure and industry sectors of the country. Its most notable 
project is the Ethiopian-Djibouti railway system, which finished as recent as 2016. Chinese 
banks breathed $3.4 billion into the projector, 70% of the $4 billion project price tag (Railway-
technology 2016). In 2013 the Economist’s Democracy Index showed that Ethiopia was 
considered an authoritarian regime and had a civil liberties score of 4.4 and an electoral process 
score of 0.0 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2013) Since 2019, the Ethiopian government had 
actually increased in its pluralism and political process on slightly, by 0.43 points (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2019). The index for political processes includes an assessment and aggregate 
based on party opposition and fairness. In 2013, the score for Ethiopia was so low, because the 
ruling party had managed to flip any remaining opposition seat, which included opposition from 
five separate parties. In the span of the last six years, there had been a slight resurgence in 
opposition presence. The civil liberty score dropped significantly; however, in 2019 to 2.65. In 
2018, the Human Rights Watch had recorded that the Ethiopian government was starting to 
reform its illiberal practices.  
 Currently, the position that Ethiopia is in with China is tricky, to say the least. The 
country has a substantial reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI), making it challenging to 
overcome their debt relief crisis. Ethiopia is also China’s second-largest African debtor ($13 
million borrowed as of 2017) right behind Angola (Faleg 2019). Half of the country’s personal 
debt is owed to China alone, and its exports have been failing within the past years. 
Understanding that, while China has been among the most willing and excessive in their 
investments, they are also slowly placing themselves in a political and domineering position in 
Ethiopia. China has since looked at Ethiopia with similar lenses as they do with Uganda, which 
is explored later in this paper. This lens sees that China utilizes African resources to facilitate its 
economic boom, while also offshoring labor to these countries for low-cost production, and thus 
eliminating middle interaction between US tariff laws (Ursu and Van Den Berg 2018).  
 While Chinese involvement in Ethiopian economic development and in the rest of the 
Horn of Africa is based on cheaper labor for China, it also gives the Asian power a chance to 
offload “ideological” development in Africa which would show that China’s soft power is 
capable of achieving “…economic development and political stability can be achieved in the 
absence of strong democratic principles” (Ursu and Van Den Berg 2018). This model strengthens 
China’s commitment to the Horn of Africa, as it strengthens their political agenda in their forum 
with the United Nations and the rest of the developing world. It is then significant that China 
remains fruitfully present in this region, almost as if Ethiopia and its neighbors are a presentation 




space for both the United States and the European Union. It appears that China has used its 
economic position and assets in the region as a basis to become more invested in securing what 
they perceive as vital to their interests. Since cooperation has ramped up with Ethiopia, China 
has demonstrated its security capabilities by holding operations in South Sudan and engaging in 
anti-piracy missions off the coasts of Ethiopia (Ursu and Van Den Berg 2018). While the EU 
should be concerned with China’s explicit desire to prove their politicization agenda viable for 
developing countries, some may question the consequences of having China become involved in 
security. China’s involvement should provide more assistance in combatting violence and 
terrorism in the area, but it would undermine the cooperative efforts of the European Union’s 
own member states. Both parties’ goals would not be the same, and their methods of engagement 
would likely hamper their own initiatives. One could also argue that these operations provide 
more military influence over Africa for China, fueling their political agenda that they are 
attempting to champion. 
  
Kenya 
 In 2014, Premier Li Keqiang signed a cooperation agreement with the Kenyan 
government to create the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, which would could the 
two cities. The project cost was reported to be around $3.2 billion to construct, a similar package 
to the Ethiopian package (BBC 2017). The project was supposedly successful, as it had produced 
over 45,000 jobs and brought in a need for railway experts, thus stimulating some career 
profession. Chinese analysts claim that the project had also added 1.5% to Kenya’s GDP. Kenya 
is among one of the more liberal case studies in the grouping, and in 2013 its score in the 
political process and civil liberties were 4.33 and 5.29, respectively. In 2019 these scores shifted 
to 3.5 and 4.41, following the government's attacks on and subsequent failure to protect 
journalists and critics that openly speak out on elections, politicians, and corruption that year. 
Kenya’s attack on its own press mimics what has been a heavily criticized issue in China’s 
censorship campaign. One cannot presume that the Kenyan government had decided to engage in 
these activities because of its newly established economic relationship with China. Keeping in 
mind that Kenya has been considered a hybrid regime for many, yet it has not been on the level 
of authoritarian behavior akin to Ethiopia’s. 
 While a renewed cooperation agreement has occurred within the last decade, trade 
cooperation between China and Kenya began in the mid-1960s. Chinese foreign direct 
investment had since been steadily channeled into the county for years to come. Now that 
investment has manifested more into public and private projects, some economists and 
anthropologists have considered that a rise in neocolonialism and ethnocentrism between the two 
countries (Kamoche and Siebers 2015). These scholars consider the negative shift in the 
relationship as a reflection of European colonialism, in which ethnic and racial bias plays a role 
in solidifying Chinese dominance over labor and planning. Kamoche and Siebers surmise that 
foreign investors are inclined to harm labor markets in Africa by the use of this tactic, as per 
example they “…may disregard local knowledge, or consider local skills as inadequate and 




to expatriate managers”( (Kamoche and Siebers 2015). The problem is often well known in local 
communities, especially for local managers, but they feel limited in their ability to speak out 
against the neglect of local knowledge and skills. It is possible that the ethnocentric labor 
practices produces frustration for local managers, and thus contributes to inefficiency in the area. 
It is then apparent that labor, of all things related to the two countries, is the least fair and 
warrants close observation. Yet while half of the employees working in Chinese firms in Kenya 
tend to be Kenyan, and their treatment is by these firms is fair…at first. Kenyan employees 
overall express dissatisfaction with working with their Chinese employers. 
 Kenyan staff has expressed that there is a lack of fairness between lower-level employees 
and Chinese firms, while managers typically enjoy their position have come to a different 
revelation. In the case of the lower-level staff, they claim that the Chinese engage in a “bait and 
switch” tactic to draw in local support for their projects. They claim that:  
“Kenyans don’t like working for Chinese. The pay is no good. Overtime is not attractive. 
They’re too mean. [they] pay well when they first come, but as they take root, they tend 
to reduce the pay. That is not very good. They come as visitors and try to endear 
themselves to the locals, and over time they tend to change although legally they’re not 
allowed to do that”  (Kamoche and Siebers 2015). 
To some, these seem like valid grievances, but to others, this may be a cause of separate cultures 
interacting with one another in settings that don’t mix well. However, this point becomes moot 
when local managers admit that “glass ceilings” do exist in Kenyan-Chinese work environments. 
Whereas the managers will claim to be happy with their position, they display dissatisfaction 
with their inability to climb the “ladder of success” so to speak. Other questionable practices 
include hiring Chinese when local competence is available (Kamoche and Siebers 2015). The 
fact that Chinese firms choose to neglect certain local options over others would suggest a not so 
widely talked about form of discrimination or at least a strong case for Chinese preference in 
foreign labor areas. 
 What we should be asking is, why does it persist if there is a recognized problem? But the 
answer is that China’s trade and cooperation position as the country’s second-largest partner has, 
and their willingness to invest with little regard for political instability in Kenya, leaves little 
room to say “no.”  Once they have been drawn into the benefits of China’s cooperation efforts, 
there is not much that these workers can do, as the companies would likely then be filled with 




 As of 2018, Sudan was one of the latest countries to begin cooperation with China. 
Sudan’s development projects were more oriented towards energy production. Beijing has been 
aiming to develop energy industries in various developing countries; however, companies that 




Sudan’s eastern ports were also developed and improved. In a more eco-friendly development, 
China has invested in Sudan’s green energy sectors, namely wind, solar, and hydropower. The 
Sudanese government had also announced a desire to develop its own nuclear-powered facility 
for peaceful use with China (Xinhuanet 2018). Sudan, like Ethiopia, was considered an 
authoritarian regime in 2013, and this has not changed within the last seven years, unfortunately. 
In 2013 the political score was at 0.0, and that had not changed in 2019. The civil liberties score 
in 2013 was 1.47, but in 2019 the rating was lowered to 1.18. As a case study, it is evident that 
Sudan does not present itself as a strong candidate, given that its democratic index was already 
low to begin, but the results still show that there has been a regression, however, so little. 
 Sudan, like Ethiopia, has gained China’s interest in security, which is mostly motivated 
by the protection of their Sudanese energy resources. As this security approach was outlined in 
the Ethiopian section of this paper, which sees that China exerts its global security influence, the 
Sudanese section shall highlight China’s contrast from Europe’s security initiatives. While China 
has established positive intentions in providing security in Sudan, the subject of that security is 
less about human safety and more about protecting Chinese interests (DUCHÂTEL 2014). 
Chinese investments, in this case, alludes to upstream and midstream security of energy, in other 
words, exploration, and production respectfully. Observing Chinese success, or lack of attacks on 
security installations suggests that they face little resistance from politically unstable regions, 
such as Sudan, or South Sudan, despite not having political experience in these regions. Look 
between the lines of this success, and one can find that China’s position of avoiding the human 
security aspect of there missions has allowed a local perception to view China’s safeguarding of 
energy as “economic in nature” (DUCHÂTEL 2014). If China is not involved in the political or 
human development of Sudan, then this could give legroom for the European Union to fill in the 
void for these tasks. However, just as was established with Ethiopia, the attractiveness of China’s 
limited political involvement in providing economic and security aid to Africa would allow 
governments to develop without strong democratic alignment. 
  
Uganda 
 In 2018, Uganda joined China’s BRI cooperation, after signing a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation. A notable construction by the Ugandan-Chinese was the Isimba 
Hydropower Plant, which created 3,000 jobs for workers, of which 80% were Ugandan (Belt and 
Road News 2019). Ugandan President Museveni was optimistic following its construction, citing 
serious issues to maintaining electricity in the country, with energy having been fueled by 
harmful diesel fuel. With a more reliable, stable, and greener fuel source, the government has 
hopes to continue Chinese cooperation by building up its industrial sector to focus on 
maintaining a strong agricultural market in the region. Uganda is the most politically 
democratically stable country of the four regional case studies; however, that is not saying much. 
The countries government was considered a hybrid regime as of 2013, just like Kenya’s. Uganda 
had the highest score of all the other – 5.67 in the political process and 6.18 in civil liberties. In 
2019 the downward trend continued on in Uganda as both scores reduced to 4..33 and 5.88, 




 Chinese interest in Uganda is mostly built around investing in Uganda’s recently 
discovered oil reserves, which are said to number at 6.6 billion barrels of untapped fuel ( (Fowdy 
2020). The investment in Ugandan oil is supposedly an attempt for China to speed up the BRI 
development in the country and help the African partner open its way to swifter progress. Oil 
securement, while not a sustainable avenue for growth, has also been supported by Europe, the 
United States, African firms, and now Chinese banks and drilling companies. In comparison, the 
hydropower plant, which is currently being constructed with the financial and labor assistance of 
China’s banks and workers, had long been shelved by other foreign investors. Uganda had faced 
a number of challenges regarding being able to obtain foreign investment; mainly, there was an 
interest in improving the sustainable development of the country’s energy sector. However, these 
challenges, such as political instability in the region, and a lack of certainty on the profitability of 
hydroelectric energy (Gore 2017). In his book, Gore states that African countries both stable and 
not, will have trouble finding advocacy from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mostly 
because it does not “fit,” or instead these focused campaigns may be considered a wasted 
investment if they are unable to assists the organizations' global campaign or message (2017, 
p.128).  Investors have also been wary of invest in Uganda’s hydro-powered facilities due to 
ongoing climate change in the country, which is brought on by its existing polluted environment. 
This makes the region overall, a hard sell for some investor, leaving the door open for China, as 
a helping hand, who has seemingly no reservations against the challenges present in Uganda.  
 China’s willingness to invest in Uganda has been thought to have been driven by their 
desire to engage in questionable diplomacy such as “debt-trapping.” As described before, this 
would mean that China’s attitude towards investment comes at a desire to solidify diplomatic and 
economic dominance over a country, regardless of the financial stipulation that occurs. 
Although, Chinese investors are potentially motivated to bestow credit on Ugandan firms due to 
their inclination to disregard regulations and practices that are internationally not welcomed. 
Looking at the forestry industry in Uganda; China has become one of the country’s top partners 
and investors in the growth and processing. However, specific tactics have been questionable, 
such as Chinese companies shipping in lumber from other African countries to the process and 
sell as Ugandan wood (IIED 2017). There are also cases of overly competitive pricing for 
products in Uganda and illegal harvesting. Overall the government does not appear to have a 
good enough understanding of industries led by Chinese companies, which typically work 
independently of the local population and use their own tools.  
 In regards to the hydroelectric power and Ugandan oil industry, it could be right to 
assume that Chinese investors are not concerned with the implications of smaller issues that do 
not affect the grand outcome at least. As it stands, the Ugandans have been put in an unusual 
position regarding investment and development in their sustainable energies and development. 
The country is more inclined than not to accept offers to revitalize a stagnant dam industry, 
which provides a cheaper alternative for fuels that have been known to cause pollution to the air 
and result in deforestation. Currently, the lack of accessibility to electricity for most of Uganda’s 
population is not solely based on the limits of infrastructure but is also limited by the 
expensiveness of sustainable energy. Should China succeed in facilitating Uganda’s water-power 




have been at the root of the countries pollution challenges for years. This does not mean, 
however, that China is focused on maintaining a clean environment for Uganda, as their history 
to engage in undesirable practices is a telling sign of their disregard for Uganda’s perception.  
 
Conclusion 
 It is evident from these cases that China has a multi-goal oriented and has several varying 
outcomes on each country. The various effects that Chinese cooperation has on these countries 
are typically subject to their preexisting political situations. For Uganda and Kenya, two the 
more democratic and politically stable countries in the region are in less of a weak position in 
dealing with Chinese dominance than the others. While an economic partnership with the 
Chinese is essential for this developing region of Africa, and while China has not explicitly 
positioned itself to interfere with the politics of these countries, it is the lack of conditions that 
make their presence harmful for liberal democracies such as the EU and the US. It is also the 
disregard of them for being more involved in environmental and social issues, which makes 
Chinese partnership potentially dangerous. While Chinese investors have solved challenges of 
being able to find foreign investors for risky projects, this often means that China is handed an 
advantage through offering economic assistance that some of these countries are unable to pay 
off. This is the case with Ethiopia, who will continue to debtor country to China’s FDIs. For the 
labor force in these countries, it seems that Chinese labor and equipment is favored over readily 
available local resources. Workers tend to express the feeling of being tricked by early Chinese 
generosity in payment and job positions, but then find that their ability to be promoted is limited 
for Chinese employees. It would seem that while yes, China provides jobs capital and jobs that 
would otherwise not be there for these countries, they have no real interest in improving the 
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